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We present the results of a survey-experiment – using a representative sample of the 
Dutch population – in which we relate respondents' opinion about the tax deductibility 
of mortgages to their estimates about other people's opinion. The experiment employs 
three treatment variables: monetary incentives, the provision of arguments pro and 
contra,  and  ambiguity  of  the  question  posed.  We  find  that  respondents  are 
characterized  by  a  significant  consensus  effect.  Respondents’  estimates  of  others’ 
opinions are strongly related to their own opinion. The size of the effect, however, is 
not  affected  by  ambiguity  of  the  question  posed.  Information  by  means  of  the 
provision of arguments pro and contra the tax provision does reduce the consensus 
effect significantly, though. Monetary incentives appear to have only a weak effect. 
We also find a strong effect of house ownership. Not only are house owners more in 
favor  of  the  tax  provision,  they  are  also  characterized  by  a  significantly  stronger 
consensus effect. These results suggest that both cognitive factors and motivational 
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1. Introduction 
 
From  the  social  psychological  literature  it  is  known  that  expectations  about  the 
behavior of others are positively correlated with one’s own behavioral inclinations. 
This is called the consensus effect (or social projection). It refers to the tendency of 
individuals  to  see  their  own  choices  and  judgments  as  relatively  common  while 
viewing  alternative  choices  and  judgments  as  relatively  uncommon  (Ross  et  al., 
1977).
1 The consensus effect is in particular observed when people are asked their 
political preferences. One can think of candidate preference (Brown, 1982), approval 
for performance of politicians (Goethals et al., 1979), agreement on specific policy 
decisions (for example boycotting the Olympics) and consent for political movements 
(Manstead, 1982). The existence of a consensus effect is also of importance from an 
economic point of view. If people are affected by a consensus effect this might imply 
that economic decision-making does not result in efficient outcomes. If traders, for 
example, overestimate the extent to which their own opinions are representative for 
those of other traders, asset prices may be biased (Forsythe et al., 1992). 
 
Several explanations for the consensus effect have been advanced. Broadly speaking, 
these  explanations  rely  on  motivational  and  cognitive  factors  (Marks  and  Miller, 
1987,  Mullen  and  Hu,  1988).  Motivational  explanations  emphasize  the  functional 
value of a person’s position relative to the position of others. Similarity between self 
and  others  may  serve  to  validate  the  appropriateness  of  a  person’s  position,  to 
maintain self-esteem, and to reduce tension in anticipated social interaction. It makes 
people feel better if they perceive and report similarity between their own position 
and that of others. Cognitive explanations, on the other hand, refer to the reasoning 
and informational process that underlie the reported position of others on an issue. 
Here, two channels may bring about a correlation between a person’s own position 
and the perceived position of others. One is what may be called selective exposure. To 
form an estimate of the positions of others in general (the whole population) it is 
                                                           
1 In the psychological literature there seems to be little doubt that the consensus effect is a judgment 
bias. Therefore, it is often called the false consensus effect. If both sides on an issue regard their own 
preference as relatively common at least one side must be wrong. But as Dawes (1990) has put forward 
this is not necessarily the case. One’s own preference is an informative signal about the population 
distribution of preferences. Oneself is a sample of size one, and if the prior belief about the underlying 
population distribution is rather imprecise, it is rational to update this prior in the direction of one’s own 
preference.   2
reasonable to rely, at least in part, on the positions one knows that some people have 
(a sample), including one’s own position. To the extent that this sample is biased, it 
will bring about a consensus effect between own position and position of others. A 
second cognitive channel is what is called object construal. Issues and questions are 
usually  ambiguous  to  some  extent  and  open  to  interpretation.  The  particular 
interpretation a person gives to an issue may affect one’s own position as well as the 
estimated position of others. Insofar as interpretations differ across individuals they 
may lead to correlations between own position and perceived position of others.  
 
Here, we want to shed some light on the causes of consensus bias. To that end we 
performed a survey-experiment using a representative sample of about 1500 Dutch 
households. First of all we asked the respondents their opinion on the tax deductibility 
of the interest on mortgages. This tax provision has been under serious attack in the 
Netherlands for some time. We also asked them to estimate the average response to 
this question in the panel. The design allows us to see whether there is a consensus 
effect by relating respondents’ own opinions to their estimates of the average opinion. 
Our contribution is twofold. First, we examine how the relationship between own 
opinions  and  estimated opinions  is  affected  by  three  treatment  variables.  Possible 
treatment  effects  can  be  used  to  discriminate  between  motivational  and  cognitive 
explanations  for  the  consensus  effect.  Our  second  contribution  is  that  we  use  a 
representative sample of (Dutch) households as our subject pool rather than students 
as  is  usually  the  case.  The  sample  allows  us  to  relate  the  consensus  effect  to 
respondents’ socio-demographic background variables.  
 
The consensus bias has received only little attention in the economic literature. In a 
step-level public good experiment, Offerman et al. (1996) look at individual value 
orientations and expectations  about  the  behavior  of  other  subjects  using  incentive 
compatible mechanisms. Among other things they wanted to see whether behavior is 
determined  by  expectations  (the  so-called  triangle  hypothesis),  or  whether 
expectations are determined by behavior (the consensus hypothesis). They find that 
persons with a cooperative value orientation contribute more than individualists do, 
but cooperators do not expect more contributions of the others than individualists do. 
Expectations were not affected systematically by behavior, which gives little support 
for the (false) consensus hypothesis. Selten and Ockenfels (1998), on the other hand,   3
report  the  presence  of  a  consensus  effect  –  as  a  by-product  –  in  the  analysis  of 
expectations about the gifts of others in a conditional three-person-gift game. A very 
clever experiment by Engelmann and Strobel (2000) is explicitly designed to examine 
whether the consensus effect is false. In a session there are 16 subjects who make a 
choice between two options. Then a subject receives information about the choices 
made by 4 other subjects in the session. Subsequently, each subject is asked to predict 
the choices of the remaining 11 subjects. The results indicate that subjects do use their 
own choice when forming an estimate about the choices of the other 11 subjects, but 
that they do not weight their own choice more heavily than the choices of the other 4 
subjects they are informed about. In other words, the authors find a consensus effect 
but no false consensus effect.
2 Note that our study is not directly oriented towards the 
question whether the consensus effect is truly false.  
 
The remainder of the paper reads as follows. We start by describing the experimental 
design and  hypotheses. Section 3  gives the results with respect to the  hypotheses 
testing and it considers the role of background variables. In section 4 we present some 
additional results on the accuracy of the estimates, the memory of the subjects, and we 
examine more closely the effect of monetary incentives. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
 
The survey-experiment was conducted under the members of a large-scale panel. The 
panel  is  set-up  and  maintained  by  CentERdata,  a  survey  research  institute, 
specializing in Internet-based surveys, which is affiliated with Tilburg University in 
the Netherlands. The panel consists of some 2000 households in the Netherlands, 
whose members fill in a questionnaire on the Internet at home every week. The panel 
is representative of the Dutch population. The survey was conducted in week 50 of 
the year 2001, and it was repeated one week later (with the same respondents). A total 
of 1761 subjects participated.  
 
                                                           
2 A follow-up study by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) suggests that representative information about 
others destroys the false consensus effect only if this representative information is presented to subjects 
on a ’silver platter’ (like in their earlier study). If a small cognitive effort is required to retrieve the 
information then it tends to be ignored and the false consensus effect reappears.     4
The topic considered in the survey-experiment is the tax deductibility of mortgages, a 
provision that has been highly debated in the Netherlands for quite some time. The 
current situation is such that people can deduct the total amount of interest they pay 
for their mortgage from their income, and the remaining income is liable for tax. 
Obviously, this tax provision is beneficial for people who have a high mortgage and 
for people who face a high marginal income tax rate. Proposals to change the tax 
provision include (i) to restrict the amount that can be deducted, irrespective of the 
level of the mortgage, (ii) to restrict the amount that can be deducted in case the 
mortgage is more than say 180000 euros.   
 
We  employed  three  treatment  variables,  in  a  2x2x2  factorial  design  in  which 
respondents  were  randomly  assigned  to  one  of  the  eight  treatments.  The  first 
treatment  variable  refers  to  the  specificity  of  the  question  posed.  Half  of  the 
respondents were confronted with a general and somewhat ambiguous policy proposal 
(Ambiguous).  They  were  asked  Question  A1:  ‘Do  you  think  a  restriction  of  the 
mortgage deductibility is fair? Denote your opinion as a grade from 1 (very unfair) to 
10 (very fair)’. The other half were confronted with a general, more specific proposal 
(Specific), Question A2: ‘Do you think a restriction of the mortgage deductibility for 
mortgages above 180000 euros is fair? Denote your opinion as a grade from 1 (very 
unfair) to 10 (very fair)’.  
 
The second treatment variable relates to the incentives the respondents received to 
provide accurate estimate of others'  opinion. In one treatment (No-pay), respondents 
were not given a monetary incentive in order to report an accurate estimate. They 
were asked Question B1: ‘What do you think the average answer (grade) is by the 
members  of  the  panel  to  the  question  whether  a  restriction  of  the  mortgage 
deductibility is fair?’. In the other treatment (Pay), the respondents were in a contest 
for a prize of 100 Euro to report an accurate estimate. They were asked Question B2: 
‘What do you think the average answer (grade) is by the members of the panel to the 
question whether a restriction of the mortgage deductibility is fair? If you are from 
100 respondents the one who estimates this grade best you will earn 100 euro’.  
 
A third treatment variable determined whether or not respondents were confronted 
with a set of arguments pro and contra the policy proposal before they gave their   5
estimate.  In  the  treatment  with  information  (Arguments),  we  posed  Question  C: 
‘Below you find six arguments  concerning the mortgage deductibility. Could you 
divide a total of 100 points over these arguments? Please assign most points to the 
argument  you  consider  most  important,  and  the  least  points  to  the  argument  you 
consider least important’. Half of the respondents who got these arguments, received 
them before they were asked the estimation question (B1 or B2), whereas the other 
half received the arguments after the estimation question. This design characteristic 
provides us with further information on the role of the consensus effect; see section 3. 
 
All respondents were asked Question A1 or A2 first. One third of the people in both 
the Specific and Ambiguous treatment were then asked Question B1 or B2, but not 
Question C. Another one third were asked Question B1 or B2, and next Question C. 
The last one third had to answer Question C first (after answering A1 or A2), and 
thereafter Question B1 or B2. This means that one third received information before 
estimating the average grade (Question B1 or B2), and two thirds had not received 
any information when estimating the average grade. The exact formulation of the 
questions can be found in Appendix 1 as well as an overview of the treatments and the 
number of respondents per treatment (Table A1).  
 
Depending  on  whether  the  consensus  effect  is  due  to  motivational  or  cognitive 
factors,  we  expect  to  find  different  effects  of  the  three  treatment  variables.  First 
consider  the  specificity  of  the  policy  proposal.  The  cognitive  explanation  of  the 
consensus effect suggests that questions that are open to wide latitude of construal 
show a stronger consensus effect than questions that are rated as permitting only a 
more narrow interpretation. In our study the policy proposal in which a specific upper 
limit on the mortgage is mentioned (Specific) is expected to be open to less wide 
interpretations than the more general proposal (Ambiguous), which does not mention 
any limits. If  the consensus  effect were due  to motivational factors,  however,  we 
would not expect the consensus effect to be related to the specificity of the proposal. 
This gives our first hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1a (motivational): Ambiguity does not affect the consensus effect. 
Hypothesis 1b (cognitive): Ambiguity increases the consensus effect. 
   6
The second hypothesis concerns the effect of monetary incentives. If the consensus 
effect is related to motivational mechanisms  such as self-esteem maintenance and 
need  for  social  support,  one  could  argue  that  the  impact  of  these  motivations  is 
reduced  by  payment.  Being  right  becomes  a  substitute  motive  to  being  similar  if 
accuracy is financially rewarded. On the other hand, if the consensus effect is due to 
cognitive factors it is less likely that payment has an effect. This yields the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2a (motivational): Monetary incentives decrease the consensus effect.  
Hypothesis 2b (cognitive): Monetary incentives do not affect the consensus effect. 
 
The last treatment hypothesis concerns the provision of arguments pro and contra the 
proposed policy change. Some argue that people process information in a self-serving 
fashion,  placing  greater  weight  on  information  that  is  consistent  with  their 
preferences.  This  may  reinforce  their  opinion  and  also  strengthen  the  perceived 
similarity between self and others. On the other hand, the arguments could also act as 
a kind of debiasing device because all subjects know the same things, and they know 
that other subjects have the same information. Moreover, the provision of information 
could  also  reduce  the  range  of  interpretation  (object  construal)  and  hence  the 
consensus effect may decrease. Together these arguments result in: 
 
Hypothesis 3a (motivational): Provision of arguments increases the consensus effect. 




In Table 1 we report the results with respect to the questions posed to the respondents. 
The answer to Question A1 or A2 will be indicated by ‘Opinion’ and the answer to 
Question  B1  or  B2  by  ‘Estimate’.
3  The  average  Opinion  in  the  Specific  scenario 
appears to be almost one point higher than in the Ambiguous scenario. The difference 
is  highly  significant  (Z=5.42,  p=0.000,  using  a  non-parametric  Mann-Whitney  U-
                                                           
3 For Opinion, only the distinction in ambiguous and specific scenario matters, whereas for Estimate 
we should show the mean Estimates by treatment. However, here we only want to give some general   7
test).
4 This difference is as expected, as the Specific scenario is the more moderate 
proposal and it may thus be considered as fairer. Furthermore, in the Ambiguous 
scenario,  the  average  Estimate  and  Opinion  are  virtually  identical,  whereas  the 
average Estimate is lower than the average Opinion in the Specific scenario.  
 
Table 1: Average Opinion on the fairness of restrictions of mortgage deductibility by 
scenario 
Scenario  Opinion  Estimate  # subjects 
Ambiguous  4.88 (2.93)  4.87 (2.09)  814 
Specific  5.70 (2.88)  5.26 (1.99)  731 
Note: standard deviations between parentheses 
 
Before we formally test the treatment hypotheses formulated in section 2 we first give 
an impression of the size of the consensus effect in the various treatments. To that end 
we have proceeded as follows (see Table 2). Both the Ambiguous and the Specific 
group,  i.e.  respondents  who  answered  question  A1  and  A2,  respectively,  are 
subdivided into two more or less equal-sized subgroups: one with an Opinion below 6 
(the unfair group), and one with an Opinion of 6 and more (the fair group).
5 For each 
group we have calculated the mean Estimate of others’ opinions. As a measure for the 
consensus effect we use the difference in mean Estimates between the fair and the 
unfair  group  (6
th  column).  The  last  column  of  the  table  indicates  whether  this 
difference is significantly different from zero. As an example, consider the Specific 
scenario, where information has been provided, but no monetary incentives. Those 
who report an Opinion below 6 (Unfair) give an average Estimate of 4.71, whereas 
those who report an Opinion of 6 and over (Fair) give an average Estimate of 5.85. 
So, the difference amounts to 1.14 and this is significantly different from zero (p = 
0.001) 
                                                                                                                                                                      
impression; the mean Estimates for each of the eight treatments separately can be found in Table A2 in 
appendix 2.  
4 Unless mentioned otherwise, all tests are two-sided non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-tests. 
5 Results are not sensitive to this choice. We have also performed the ensuing analyses with the group 
median as the cut-off point. This leads to very similar results. Because of the Dutch grading system in 
school, taking 6 as a cut-off point seems a natural thing to do.   8
Table 2: Mean Estimates by Opinion (fair / unfair) and treatment. 
Scenario  Arguments  Paid   Group  Estimate  Difference  Sign (p) 
Unfair  4.71 
No 
Fair  5.85 
1.14  0.001 
Unfair  5.01 
Yes 
Yes 
Fair  5.69 
0.68  0.101 
Unfair  4.18  
No 
Fair  5.78 
1.60  0.000 




Fair  6.03 
1.56  0.000 
Unfair  4.34 
No 
Fair  5.84 
1.50  0.000 
Unfair  5.07 
Yes 
Yes 
Fair  5.63 
0.56  0.183 
Unfair  3.93 
No 
Fair  5.60 
1.67  0.000 




Fair  5.89 
1.83  0.000 
 
The  table  shows  that  in  the  two  treatments  with  Arguments  and  Payment  the 
consensus effect is small and not significant at the 10% level, whereas it is significant 
in the other six treatments. The strongest treatment effect appears to be whether or not 
respondents are provided with a list of arguments before they give their estimates. In 
all  four  pairwise  comparisons,  i.e.  when  we  control  for  the  treatment  variables 
Ambiguous  and  Payment,  the  consensus  effect  tends  to  be  smaller  with  these 
Arguments. The decrease in the consensus effect is strongest when subjects are paid 
for  their  estimates.  The  effect  of  information  is  in  the  direction  predicted  by  the 
cognitive explanation for the consensus effect (Hypothesis 3b). The conclusions on 
the other two treatment variables are less clear, and do not allow us to distinguish 
clearly between the motivational and cognitive explanations for the consensus effect. 
Therefore, we will now turn to a more formal and systematic test of the hypotheses. In 
the  next  section  we  perform  regression  without  taking  the  socio-demographic   9
background variables into account, while in section 3.2 we extend the analysis by 
adding the background variables.  
  
3.1 Treatment hypotheses 
In order to test the hypotheses more formally we perform a simple linear regression 
(OLS)  in  which  we  take  Estimate  as  the  dependent  variable.  The  Opinion  of  the 
respondent is included as an independent variable in order to measure the consensus 
effect. We also include dummies for the three treatment variables, and interaction 
effects between Opinion and the three treatment dummies, allowing us to test whether 
any of the treatment variables strengthens or weakens the consensus effect. Hence, we 
estimate the following equation.
6  
 
Estimatei   2SLQLRQi 
7UHDW 
7UHDW´ Opinioni     (1) 
 
ZKHUH  DQG  DUH FRHIILFLHQWV  DQG  DUH YHFWRUV RI FRHIILFLHQWV (VWLPDWHi  is 
respondent i’s estimate of the average Opinion, Opinioni is respondent i’s opinion on 
restricting the tax provision, and Treat = (Specific, Paid, Arguments) are the treatment 
dummies. Results can be found in the first three columns of Table 3. 
 
Note first of all that the regression results verify the existence of a consensus effect: 
WKHHVWLPDWHGFRHIILFLHQW LVSRVLWLve, 0.353, and clearly significant at p=0.000. This 
can  be  interpreted  as  the  average  size  of  the  consensus  effect  in  the  Ambiguous 
treatment, without Arguments and without Payment, i.e. when all treatment dummies 
are equal to zero. All interactions between Opinion and the treatment dummies reduce 
the size of  the consensus  effect, but  only the coefficients for the interaction with 
Arguments  and  Payment  are  significantly  different  from  zero.  That  is,  providing 
Arguments  reduces  the  consensus  effect  significantly  with  about  0.10.  Monetary 
incentives decrease the consensus effect somewhat less (almost 0.07), and this effect 
                                                           
6 As the dependent variable Estimate Î[0,10] a transformation of it is appropriate. However, using log 
((Estimate/(10-Estimate))  does  not  give  better  or  other  results,  whereas  the  error  term  when  only 
Estimate has been used also appears to follow the normal distribution. We therefore use the latter 
specification, which is easier to interpret.   10 




Table 3: Regression results for Estimate without and with background variables as 
explanatory variables 




house owners  tenants 
  coeff  p-value  coeff  p-value  coeff  p-value  coeff  p-value 
Intercept  2.903  0.000  2.874  0.000  2.002  0.000  4.130  0.000 
Opinion  0.353  0.000  0.304  0.000  0.477  0.000  0.134  0.053 
Specific  0.363  0.082  0.455  0.043  0.455  0.071  0.374  0.452 
Paid  0.578  0.005  0.414  0.038  0.554  0.025  0.395  0.428 
Arguments  0.865  0.000  0.839  0.000  1.247  0.000  -0.898  0.106 
Opinion´Specific  -0.037  0.274  -0.047  0.200  -0.058  0.181  -0.020  0.796 
Opinion´Paid  -0.066  0.051  -0.036  0.327  -0.078  0.067  0.009  0.905 
Opinion´Arg.   -0.105  0.004  -0.097  0.014  -0.159  0.000  0.145  0.086 
Owner      -0.631  0.026         
Opinion´Owner      0.105  0.018         
Old      0.721  0.001  0.811  0.001     
Opinion´Old      -0.061  0.096  -0.098  0.022     
Poor      0.642  0.005  0.577  0.022     
Opinion´Poor      -0.067  0.077  -0.058  0.184     
R
2  0.16    0.18    0.21    0.06   
N  1453    1223    887    335   
F  41.12    21.21    22.59    4.19   
  1.89    1.87    1.86    1.90   
 
The consequences for the hypotheses are mixed. The significant effect of Arguments 
lends support for the cognitive explanation of the consensus effect (Hypothesis 3b). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  marginally  significant  effect  of  Payment  points  into  a 
motivational direction and is evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2a. As Specific appears 
to have no significant effect on the size of the consensus effect this points in the 
direction of Hypotheses 1a (motivational).   
 
                                                           
7 If we include higher order interaction terms of Opinion and the treatment dummies none of them 
turns out to be significantly different from zero.     11 
3.2 The effect of socio-demographic variables 
Contrary to many other experiments our subject pool does not consist of students. Our 
panel is constructed to be a representative sample of Dutch households. In addition, 
due to the panel features we have data on several background variables. For example, 
we have data on gender, age, religious orientation, family composition, profession, 
income,  political  orientation,  and  whether  they are  tenants  or  house  owners.  This 
latter  variable  seems  particularly  interesting  in  the  present  context,  since  house 
owners have a much larger stake in maintaining mortgage deductibility. It is often 
argued that the strength of a (false) consensus effect may depend on the importance of 
the item or topic under consideration (Marks and Miller 1987, Campbell 1986, Crano 
1983).  There  exist  two  competing  predictions  with  regard  to  the  effects  of  topic 
relevance  on  the consensus  effect.  Crano  (1983)  reports  that  subjects  give  higher 
consensus estimates for opinions on which they have a vested interest. On the other 
hand,  Campbell  (1986)  finds  that  opinion  relevance  is  associated  with  smaller 
consensus effects.    
 
We examine the effect of background variables by including demographic variables 
(which are all transformed  into  binary  variables) in specification  (1). To examine 
whether any of the background variables affects the consensus effect we incorporate 
interaction  terms  between  Opinion  and  each  of  the  demographic  variables.  This 
results in the following specification:  
 




=i ´ Opinioni i  (2) 
 
where  Zi  is  a  vector  of  eight  dummy  variables  which  take  on  a  value  of  one, 
respectively, if respondent i (a) is female, (b) is above the median age of 45, (c) has a 
college  education  or  higher,  (d)  is  religious,  (e)  is  a  student,  (f)  is  married  or 
cohabiting,  (g)  has  children,  (h)  is  a  house  owner, and  (i)  is  poor,  i.e.  has  a  net 
household income below the median value (< ¼SHUPRQWK,QIRUPDWLRQRQWKH
various variables can be found in Table A3 in Appendix 2. 
 
The estimation results of specification (2) are shown in the fourth and fifth column of 
Table 3. In the table, only the significant estimates for the background variables are 
displayed.   12 
 
The regression results EHDU RXW WKH FRQVHQVXV HIIHFW WKH HVWLPDWHG FRHIILFLHQW  LV
somewhat lower than in specification (1), namely 0.30, but still clearly positive and 
highly significant (p=0.000). Furthermore, the results indicate that of the interactions 
between  Opinion  and  the  treatment  variables  now  only  Opinion  ´  Arguments  is 
significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  5%  level.  The  coefficient  is  negative, 
indicating that Opinion is less important as an explanatory variable for Estimate if the 
respondents  are  provided  with  Information  pro  and  contra.  This  confirms  the 
“objectivizing”  (or  debiasing)  effect  of  this  treatment  variable.  The  interactions 
Opinion ´ Paid and Opinion ´ Specific both have negative coefficients but neither is 
significantly different from zero. Note that in specification (1) the interaction term 
with Paid  was  more  negative  and marginally  significant  (p=0.051).  So  while first 
monetary incentives seemed to weaken the consensus effect, this effect disappears 
when background variables are incorporated.  
 
Of the background variables (Z), in particular the distinction between tenants and 
house owners proves relevant (we will elaborate on this below). Only for this variable 
ERWKWKH DQGWKH FRHIILFLHQWDUHVLJQLILFDQWO\GLIIHUHQWIURP]HURDWWKHOHYHO 
7KHLQWHUDFWLRQHIIHFWZLWK2SLQLRQLVVLJQLILFDQWO\SRVLWLYH !LQGLFDWLQJWKDWRQ
average house-owners submit Estimates that are more closely related to their own 
Opinion  than  do  tenants.  Furthermore,  elderly  people  give  significantly  higher 
estimates, whereas the interaction effect with Opinion is significantly negative at the 
10%-level.  People  with  an  income  below  the  median  give  a  significantly  higher 
estimate. Again, the interaction effect with Opinion is negative (p=0.077), suggesting 
that relatively poor people are less affected by the consensus effect. Finally, note that 
we also included a dummy variable for the 39 (2.2%) students in the panel. This 
dummy and its interaction with Opinion are not statistically significant. The students 
do not display a consensus effect that is different in magnitude than others in the 
population.  Also  other  background  variables  have  no  effect  on  the  size  of  the 
consensus effect. 
 
The  foregoing  results  confirm  our  findings  in  section  3.1.  We  find  evidence  for 
cognitive  and  motivational  explanations.  In  particular,  the  significant  impact  of   13 
Arguments  pleas  for  the  role  of  cognitive  factors,  whereas  the  (strong)  effect  of 
ownership and the (weak) effect of monetary incentives point to the relevance  of 
motivational factors. 
 
3.3 The effect of house ownership 
As house-ownership is obviously one of the most important variables we conclude 
this section by dwelling somewhat more on the effect of this variable. About 68% of 
the  sample  are  house  owners  (see  Table  A3  in  Appendix  2).  Given  the  interests 
involved it seems likely that Opinions and Estimates differ between house owners and 
tenants. Table 4 shows the mean values of these variables for both categories, split by 
scenario (Ambiguous/Specific), as well as the correlation coefficient between Opinion 
and Estimate.   
 
Table 4: Mean Opinion and Estimate for owners and tenants by scenario 
    Owners      Tenants   
Scenario  Opinion  Estimate  Correlation  Opinion  Estimate  Correlation 
Ambiguous  4.45  4.72  0.433  5.94  5.11  0.232 
Specific  5.57  5.20  0.379  6.10  5.44  0.237 
Total  4.97  4.94  0.420  6.02  5.28  0.235 
 
A first remarkable observation from the table is that for owners the Ambiguity of the 
proposal  clearly  matters,  whereas  this  distinction  seems  much  less  important  for 
tenants. Not unexpectedly, owners judge the proposal as less fair than tenants. This 
holds for both the Ambiguous and the Specific proposal and the differences are highly 
significant.  The  same  tendency  can  be  observed  for  Estimates,  but  only  in  the 
Ambiguous scenario the difference is significant. The higher correlation coefficients 
for  owners  support  the  previously  made  statement  that  owners  display  a  stronger 
consensus effect than tenants. This is in line with Crano’s findings that subjects give 
higher consensus estimates for opinions on which they have a vested interest (Crano, 
1983).  
 
To get more insight in the impact of house ownership on the consensus effect and the 
relative importance of the factors that may affect the size of the effect, we re-estimate   14 
specification  (2)  for  owners  and  tenants  separately.  The  results  are  presented  in 
columns 6 and 7, and 8 and 9 of Table 3 respectively.  
 
A first thing to notice is that the estimate for the consensus effect is much higher for 
owners  than  for  tenants,  0.477  versus  0.134.  Furthermore,  while  for  owners  the 
provision of information leads to significantly higher Estimates and a significantly 
smaller consensus effect, for tenants both effects are just the opposite (both significant 
at  the  10%  level).  Similarly,  it  appears  that  owners  are  affected  by  monetary 
incentives but tenants are not. The dummies for the background variables old and 
poor have some impact on the consensus effect of owners but not of tenants. Actually 
for tenants none of the variables is significant at the 5% level, which results in a very 
low R
2 of 0.06. The observed differences between the results for owners and tenants 
suggest that motivational factors are important for the consensus effect.  
 
4. Additional results 
 
In this section we present some additional results on the accuracy of the estimates, the 
memory of the subjects and incentive effects.  
 
4.1 Accuracy 
First we examine whether the treatment variables have an effect on the accuracy of 
respondents’ predictions. For each respondent we compute the error as the absolute 
value of the difference between the Estimate and the mean value of Opinion in the 
relevant  scenario  (Specific  or  Ambiguous).  Table  5  shows  the  mean  errors  by 
treatment  for  all  respondents  (first  four  columns,  the  last  four  columns  will  be 
discussed somewhat later).  
 
From  the  table  we  can  infer  that  the  mean  errors  are  not  much  affected  by  the 
treatment variables. Whether or not Arguments are provided before the Estimate does 
not have any effect on the average error. Remarkably, paying the subjects for making 
accurate  estimates  does  not  make  errors  smaller.  In  fact,  errors  are  larger  with 
Payment, and this is the only effect that is statistically significant, if we run a simple 
OLS regression with the absolute error as the dependent variable and dummies for the 
treatment variables as explanatory variables.   15 






No pay       Pay 
Owners 
No pay      Pay 
Tenants 
No pay      Pay 
Ambiguous  No  1.59  1.89  1.63  1.88  1.47  1.89 
Ambiguous  Yes  1.66  1.99  1.72  2.00  1.51  1.93 
Specific  No  1.65  1.70  1.70  1.79  1.53  1.50 
Specific  Yes  1.54  1.89  1.48  1.97  1.70  1.74 
Total  1.60  1.83  1.63  1.88  1.54  1.71 
 
Marks and Miller (1987) and Campbell (1986) argue that the absolute accuracy of 
estimation  increases  as  opinion  relevance  (i.e.  personal  importance  of  the  issue) 
increases.  Applied  to  our  situation  this  suggests  that  house  owners  make  more 
accurate Estimates. To test this claim we consider the mean errors by treatment for 
house  owners  and  tenants  separately  (see  the  last  four  columns  of  Table  5).  The 
results do not lend support for the claim: if anything, house owners make less accurate 
estimates than tenants. Indeed, if we extent the above-mentioned analysis with the 
absolute error as dependent variable by adding ownership as explanatory variable in 
addition  to  dummies  for  the  treatment  variables,  it  turns  out  that  the  estimated 




In this section we briefly look at the memory of the respondents. In the information 
treatments subjects had to distribute 100 points over six arguments (see Appendix 1). 
One week later the subjects in these treatments were asked which arguments they 
could remember and reproduce. Most of the people, 918 of the 1110 subjects (82.7%) 
did not reproduce any argument (perhaps because they were not incentivized to do 
so). The remaining 192 subjects could reproduce a total of 301 arguments, most of 
them (110) producing only one;
9 23 persons remembered three or more arguments.   
 
                                                           
8 Campbell also argues that subjects may have been less biased and more accurate on relevant opinions 
because they are better informed on personally important issues, thus suggesting an interaction effect 
between information and ownership. Our results do not support this.   
9 Note that some people ‘reproduced’ arguments not mentioned in the survey. More specific, 15.61% 
of the reported arguments were arguments that did not belong to the list mentioned in the first week.   16 
If  we  consider  which  arguments  are  remembered  it  turns  out  that  the  strongest 
arguments pro and contra are remembered most often. Argument 2 about possible 
financial  problems,  which  can  be  seen  as  an  argument  against  restriction  of  the 
mortgage  deductibility,  was  reproduced  82  times  while  argument  4,  that  the  rich 
benefit more, i.e., an argument in favor of restriction, was reproduced 57 times. We 
can relate the memory of arguments to the Opinions (and Estimates). Respondents 
who  remembered  arguments  against  (in  favor)  tended  to  have  a  lower  (higher) 
Opinion score, 5.23 versus 6.31, suggesting that people remember the arguments that 
support ‘their’ opinion. This way of remembering might strengthen their consensus 
effect but we find no evidence for this. The difference between the subjects who 
remember arguments contra and pro does not show up in the Estimates of the average 
grade by others (4.74 versus 4.83). 
  
We  can  elaborate  a  bit  on  this  by  looking  at  the  relation  between  Opinion  and 
Estimate at the one hand and memory on the other hand. It has been argued that 
memory for specific instances may be irrelevant (Shedler and Manis, 1986), and that 
no study has included a measure of memory for assessing the correlation between 
immediate recall and magnitude of projection (Marks and Miller, 1987). Although we 
cannot say too much about it, our data allow for some analysis. It turns out that the 
correlation  between  Opinion  and  Estimate  is  strongest  for  the  people  who 
remembered  arguments  in  favor  (0.475),  weakest  for  the  respondents  who 
remembered  arguments  against  (0.248)  while  for  the  respondents  who  could  not 
reproduce any argument it is in between (0.359).
10  
 
4.3 Incentive effect 
The analyses in the previous sections suggest that paying or not paying the subjects 
has at most a marginally significant effect on the size of the consensus effect. But 
does this imply that there is no incentive effect at all? When we look more closely at 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Furthermore, being a tenant or a house owner appeared to have little effect on how many and which 
arguments were remembered.   
10 When computing these correlations we control for possible differences between proposals. While the 
differences in correlations between the scenarios were very small for respondents who could remember 
no arguments or only arguments in favor of, they were very large for respondents who remembered 
arguments against (+ 0.410 for the Ambiguous proposal versus –0.031 for the Specific proposal).  We 
see no obvious reason for this difference.   17 
the answers, some remarkable differences between the payment and the no-payment 
treatment can be observed. 
 
First, the fraction of "I don’t know" answers to the estimation question is considerably 
lower in the payment treatment (8.5%) than in no-payment treatment (17.3%). This, 
of course, makes sense. Even if people really have no clue, they still have an incentive 
to  submit  an  Estimate  in  order  to  be  eligible  for  the  100  Euro  in  the  payment 
treatment.  
 
Table 6:  Logistic regression for Prominence with  treatment dummies, background 
variables and interaction effects with payment  
  &RHIILFLHQW   ([S   p-value 
Specific  -0.210  0.810  0.117 
Paid  -2.730  0.065  0.000 
Arguments  0.061  1.063  0.666 
Education  0.420  1.521  0.038 
Education ´ Paid   -0.683  0.505  0.015 
Partner  -0.576  0.562  0.045 
Partner ´ Paid  0.580  1.786  0.123 
Female  -0.221  0.802  0.264 
Female ´ Paid  0.632  1.882  0.020 
Old  0.093  1.098  0.666 
Old ´ Paid  0.513  1.671  0.084 
-2Loglikelihood = 1655, n = 1515 
 
Moreover, the number of people who chose a prominent number (i.e. x.00 or x.50) is 
clearly  affected  by  monetary  incentives.  The  fraction  of  subjects  estimating  such 
numbers is 74.9% (n=729) in the no-payment, but only 24.4% (n=804) in the payment 
treatment. So although Payment does not lead to qualitative differences, it seems to 
affect people and to motivate them to make other (but not more precise) estimates. 
Therefore we perform a logistic regression with Prominence (being 1 if a prominent 
number has been given and 0 otherwise) as the dependent variable, and the treatment 
variables and socio-economic variables as the independent variables. Also we include 
interaction  terms  between  the  socio-economic  variables  and  the  Pay  treatment   18 
variable.  The  results  (see  Table  6)  indicate  that  Payment  is  a  highly  significant 
variable,  reducing  the  number  of  prominent  estimates.  The  other  two  treatment 
variables have coefficients that are not significantly different from zero. (Why would 
they?) From the interaction effects with Pay we can infer that younger, male and more 
educated respondents are more strongly affected by the Pay treatment, giving fewer 
prominent estimates when paid for making accurate estimates.  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Our  study  started  from  the  observation  in  the  social  psychological  literature  that 
expectations about the behavior of others are positively correlated with one’s own 
preferences. This consensus effect has received only little attention in the economic 
literature. In this paper we consider the role of the consensus effect in relationship to 
an economic issue that is under discussion in the Netherlands, to wit the proposal to 
abolish the tax deductibility of interest payments on mortgages. In addition, we try to 
explain where the consensus effect – if present – has been rooted. Does it stem from 
motivational factors or are cognitive factors at work?  
 
We do find clear indications for the existence of a consensus effect in our experiment. 
The regression results suggest that if a person's own support for the tax proposal 
increases by 1 point (on a scale of 1 to 10), this person's estimate of others' support on 
average  increases  by  about  0.35  points.  Moreover,  the  results  indicate  that  the 
consensus effect decreases if people are provided with arguments for and against the 
proposal.  Also  providing  people  with  a  monetary  incentive  to  give  an  accurate 
estimate about others' opinion affects the consensus effect. This suggests that both 
cognitive and motivational factors determine the consensus effect.  
 
If we look at socio-demographic variables by far the most important factor is house 
ownership. House owners indicate a much lower support for the tax proposal. More 
interesting  is  that  they  also  display  a  much  stronger  consensus  effect.  As  house 
ownership can be considered to be a measure of topic relevance and vested interest, 
this finding suggests that motivational factors are at work here.  
   19 
Another remarkable finding is that incentivizing subjects to make accurate estimates 
does not lead to better estimates. On the contrary, payment is found to reduce the 
accuracy of the estimates. At the same time, it is not the case that the payments have 
no affect at all. When people are paid to make accurate estimates the frequency of "I 
don’t know" responses decreases. Also they tend to give less prominent numbers (in 
order to increase their chances of winning).  This suggest that subjects really try to 
make good estimates, but that paying them to do so simply does not help. 
 
The finding that cognitive and motivational factors are of influence implies that the 
consensus  effect  might  be  relevant  for  economic  applications.  For,  whereas  a 
consensus bias due to motivational factors can be opposed quite easily by means of 
monetary incentives, a consensus effect due to cognitive factors cannot always be 
combated in a simple way. Our results also illustrate that it is not straightforward to 
determine the relative importance of both explanations, and that the forces at work 
may be quite complex and subtle. 
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Appendix 1. Survey questions and overview of the treatments 
 
A1: Do you think a restriction of the mortgage deductibility is fair? Denote your opinion as a 
grade from 1 (very unfair) to 10 (very fair). 
 A2: Do you think a restriction of the mortgage deductibility for mortgages above 400000 
Dutch guilders
11 is fair? Denote your opinion as a grade from 1 (very unfair) to 10 (very fair). 
 
B1: What do you think the average answer (grade) is by the members of the panel to the 
question whether a restriction of the mortgage deductibility is fair? 
B2: What do you think the average answer (grade) is by the members of the panel to the 
question  whether  a  restriction  of  the  mortgage  deductibility  is  fair?  If  you  are  from  100 
respondents the one who estimates this grade best you will earn 100 euro.   
  
C: Below you find six arguments concerning the mortgage deductibility. Could you divide a 
total  of  100  points  over  these  arguments?  You  assign  most  points  to  the  argument  you 
consider most important, and the least points to the argument you consider least important. 
 
Argument 1: A majority of the Dutch population expects that the mortgage deductibility will 
disappear within the next 10 years. 
Argument 2: Restriction of the mortgage deductibility causes major financial problems to a 
lot of households. 
Argument 3: Restriction of the mortgage deductibility will reduce traffic jam problems. 
Argument 4: From every guilder paid as rent, house owners with a high income receive more 
tax money back than those with a low income. 
Argument 5: The regulation for mortgage deductibility differs among countries. 




Table A1: Overview of the treatments 
Treatment  Scenario  Arguments  Monetary incentives  Question order  # respondents 
1  Ambiguous  No  No  A1, B1  278 
2  Ambiguous  Yes  No  A1, C, B1  103 
3  Ambiguous  No  Yes  A1, B2  288 
4  Ambiguous  Yes  Yes  A1, C, B2  131 
5  Specific  No  No  A2, B1  197 
6  Specific  Yes  No  A2, C, B1  151 
7  Specific  No  Yes  A2, B2  282 
8  Specific  Yes  Yes  A2, C, B2  103 
                                                           
11 400000 Dutch guilders are about 180000 euros.  
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Appendix 2. Additional information on estimates and socio-demographic variables 
 
Table A2 displays the mean Estimate of the others’ opinion for each of the eight treatments 
along with the number of subjects in each treatment.   
 
Table A2: Mean Estimate of Opinion by treatment  
    No pay  Pay 
Scenario  Arguments  Estimate  # subjects  Estimate  # subjects 
Ambiguous  No  4.67 (1.93)  278  4.85 (2.17)  288 
Ambiguous  Yes  4.99 (2.02)  103  5.27 (2.23)  131 
Specific  No  5.09 (1.96)  197  5.34 (1.97)  282 
Specific  Yes  5.29 (1.94)  151  5.31 (2.19)  103 
Note: standard deviation between parentheses 
 
The pairwise comparisons of the treatments give an impression of the effect of the treatment 
variables Specific, Arguments and Payment on Estimate. It turns out that the Estimates in the 
Ambiguous and the  Specific scenario  are significantly  different if respondents  receive no 
Arguments before (p<0.02) but are not significantly different if estimations are made after the 
subjects have received Arguments pro and contra. The effect of Arguments seems limited; 
only  in  the  Ambiguous  scenario  with  Payment  the  provision  of  Arguments  leads  to 
significantly  higher  estimations  (p=0.075).  The  other  comparisons  reveal  no  significant 
differences.  
 
Table A3 presents information on the sample means of the socio-demographic variables that 
are used in specification (2) along with the average Opinion and Estimate.  
 
Table A3: Sample means of background variables 
  N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  s.d. 
Estimate  1533  1.00   10.00  5.058  2.051 
Opinion  1422  1.00  10.00  5.300  2.920 
Net household income  
(¼SHUPRQWK 
1644  0  8182  2220  1080 
(a) Female  1761  0  1  0.442  0.497 
(b) Old  1761  0  1  0.507  0.500 
(c) High education  1761  0  1  0.371  0.483 
(d) Religious  1761  0  1  0.587  0.493 
(e) Student  1761  0  1  0.022  0.147 
(f) Partner  1761  0  1  0.760  0.430 
(g) Children  1761  0  1  0.403  0.649 
(h) Owner  1453  0  1  0.684  0.465 
(i) Poor  1761  0  1  0.403  0.649 
Note: only net household income < ¼SHUPRQWKLQFOXGHG 
 